

Yank Valor In 'Bulge' Made Bitter Christmas Of 1944 An Epic Chapter In American History

Reporters of The Star-Times-Chicago Tribune Service who were on the scene continue their series of notable accounts of major American engagements which paved the

BY WILLIAM STRAND,

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THE ALLIED winter offensive
Twas exactly one month old
when the German line burst into
flame along a 70-mile front
southeast of Aachen on December 16, 1944. The thunder of
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sheralded the start of the Battle

The events of those four fate ul weeks constitute one of the

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prominent place in the lore of merican valor.

In Bastogne's public square today is a sign placed there as a permanent reminder of the battle for that city, which marked the turning point in Hitler's last gamble for victory. It says: "This is Bastogne, Bastion of

"This is Bastogne, Bastion the Battered Bastards of 101st American Airborne D sion."

It was the 101st which sent back the reply, "Nuts!," to an enemy demand for surrender of the beleagured garrison.

PIELD MARSHAL VON RUND-STEDT gambled on the weather as an ally for his surprise blow. For days before he launched the Battle of the Bulge, extreme cold and lack of visibility through fog and snow had kept both comgrounded. Thus the Nasis were able to assemble their striking force secretly.

Von Rundstedt's lunge carried his ammored speathead, so mile to Belgium and only five milet from the French frontier. It was shoulder and on the Stoumont Malmody Line; it was split as bastogne; delayed at St. Vith and finally smashed at Celles it a tank battle of unbellevable fury in which the cream of German armor was destroyed by the me-

chanical monsters from America.

If the German commander had reached Leige he might have been in position to destroy the American First and Ninth Armies plus the British Second and Canadian First Armies. A thrust from Leige to Antwerp and the sea would have bottled up these forces and their was torces of rores and their vast stores of

Paratroopers were dropped behind our lines and specially trained teams of subcleurs wearing American and British uniforms infilirated our positions. Elements of more than 28 German divisions were identified in the Bulge, including 10 Panner or Panner Grenadier divisions and two crack paratrop divisions. These represented the bulk of the enemy's strategic reserves.

As VON RUNDSTEDT prepared to strike, six Allied armies were grouped along the western approaches to Germany. The front had been pushed to the Roer River after a month of hard, steady slugging in which the daily Allied gains were measured in yards. The weight of the Nazi blow was aimed at the lower section of Hodges' 5th corps and the entire length of the United States slepth corns.

The predawn barrage was ferocious, with shells crashing down on the forward positions at the rate of more than 250 an hour in some sectors. When It litted, doughboys crouching in their foxholes asw the wanguard of two armored spearneeds rumbling forward suddenly out of the morn-

These were what the Germans call "reconnissance in force." bat teams, designed to hit a terrife punch on a narrow front and go as far as they could Bursting through the thin Amerexpected success. The northern column carved a salient 10 miles wide and six miles deep in the success and the success of th

North of Trier, meanwhile, local attacks by the 5th Panzer army had found another soft spot in the American lines in the direction of Bastogne.

Von Rundstedt put on the pressure through these three gaps and poured his divisions into the bulge as fast as he could move them along the highways. The next day the First and 12th 88 spearheads joined just east of 8t. Vith and formed a single wedge, 12 miles deep and 20 miles wide, in the heart of the western front.

IT WAS increasingly plain in those first terrible hours that some one had erred; that the Germans' ability to mount an offensive of such magnitude had been grossly underestimated.

There were other reasons why the enemy won an early success in the Ardennes. Allied officers, from the field to the high command, were offensive-minded and had grown careless in such ordinary military safeguards as laying mine fields, preparing road blocks for emergencies and otherwise planning a complete defensive system.

A marked contrast became apparent as soon as the German offensive was launched. Feverish preparations for defense in depth were started immediately all along the front the first day and continued until commanders were certain the drive had been stopped.

The Allies had believed the Artdennes was not an advantageous spot from which to launch a winter offensow. The lightly held enter the spot of the spot of the spot sisted afterward, was a calculated risk that had to be taken. As a consequence, this sector became a rest area for battle worn divisions or for new untried outfits. The full strength of the German The full strength of the German 108th division, which had arrived in Germany only five days before.

THE story of the 106th disaster began at 5:50 a.m. with the opening of the tremendous barrage which moved with dread certainty acrose the fields into the artillery emplacements. By 63 and the support of the suppor

Five minutes after the shellin of the front lines began, the Ger mans opened up against division headquarters. By early mornin of December 17 two Nazi divisions were swarming through the 108th's ares

By mid-day they had swampe the 422nd and 423rd regiment. Their last brief radio message were received that afternoo. The Americans were ordered t stay and fight and this they di until captured or killed. It was their stubborn vallor which mad the first contribution to the disruption of the Nazi time schedule.

One German drive beating around the 106th on the north had been headed toward Mande field. At the same time, anothe column was pouring down throad to Bleislif. The latter force swung north to link with the other column at Schonberg, making the entrapment complete or the Elfel slopes east of St. Vith.

That road junction was vital the Germans, who fought bitte ly to take it, but combat comman B of the 9th armored division reached it after an all night rac Together with what was left of the 106th, the combat comman put up fiere resistance.

Hodges, seeing instantly that St. Vith was vital, sent Brig. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck's Seventh Armored Division roaring across the path of the German armor to the aid of the sorely pressed garrison.

The Seventh Armored, thoug virtually surrounded, stood lik a rock for five days of constant battering. It was another example of the courage that delaye the Nazi rush and, in the lon run, saved the situation.

The First and 12th Nazi St divisions, meanwhile, were driving on after bigger game. The by-passed St. Vith to the north ir a headlong drive toward Liege The 12th SS ran head-on into the veteran American First Division which was rushing south from a rest area.

With the American First, which had been in corps reserve, was the veterans Ninth Division, supported on the right by the Second and 99th Divisions. The 99th had not been in a major engagement before. But it passed its first big test.

At one time the enemy drove to within 200 yards of the Second Division command post, then was hurled back with a loss of 5 tanks. The Ninth never yielded an inch.

And true to its great traditions the historic First stopped th German drive cold in blood fighting December 21-22-23 thu enabling the American Fifth Corps to secure the northern shoulder of the Bulge.

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